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McCulloch: Let Me Show You How: Pro Se Deivorce Courses and Client Power

PRO BONO WORK AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR THE POOR:
REAL CHANGE OR IMAGINED CHANGE?
Michelle S. Jacobs*
For the past twenty-five years, the American Bar Association and
state and local bars have debated the responsibility of members of the
profession to perform pro bono work on behalf of the poorest members
of our society.' The debate recently extended into whether law students
should be expected or required to perform pro bono work.2 There seems
to be no disagreement that the legal needs of the poor are not being
met.3 The debate swirls primarily around whether the responsibility for
doing pro bono work is an individual moral decision to be undertaken
voluntarily or whether it is a professional obligation which can be
imposed upon each member of the bar.
The arguments for and against mandatory pro bono have been
examined thoroughly over the past fifteen years in numerous scholarly
articles and in law-related presses and journals. Yet, the issue of how to
best address the unmet legal needs of the poor remains unresolved.
Estimates indicate that presently only approximately twenty to twentyfive percent of the legal needs of the poor are being met.4 Of the many
states that have considered how to address the unmet needs of the poor,
several have proposed the imposition of mandatory pro bono.' The

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law.
1. See Ronald H. Silverman, Conceivinga Lawyer's Legal Duty to the Poor, 19 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 885, 888-94 (1991) (tracing the chronology of the debate beginning with a 1972
proposal to the American Bar Foundation).
2. Wendy F. Rau, The Unmet Legal Needs of the Poor in Maine: Is Mandatory ProBono
the Answer, 43 ME. L. REV. 235, 262 (1991) (identifying Tulane Law School as the first law
school to impose a requirement of mandatory pro bono on the students); see also Caroline
Durham, Law Schools Making a Difference: An Examination of Public Service Requirements,
13 LAW & INEQ. 39, 40-41 nn.7-8 (1994) (identifying the 20 law schools adopting mandatory
pro bono graduation requirements, as well as others that encourage voluntary student efforts).
3. Disagreement does exist, however, as to whether the need has reached "crisis" levels.
See Committee to Improve the Quality of Legal Services, FinalReport to the Chief Judge of the
State of New York, 19 HoFSTRA L. REv. 755, 846 (1991) (statement by Thomas F Gleason)
[hereinafter Marrero Committee Report]; John C. Scully, Mandatory Pro Bono: An Attack on
the Constitution, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1229, 1234-35 (1991).
4. Omar J. Arcia, Objections, Administrative Difficulties and Alternatives to Mandatory
Pro Bono Legal Services in Florida,22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 771, 774 (1995) (noting in Florida
the unmet need has been estimated at 20%).
5. Silverman, supra note 1, at 894 n.18 (describing the states which have suggested
mandatory plans and the resulting action taken by the states).
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organized bar membership regularly and routinely has spoken (and
voted) against the adoption of mandatory programs.6
The opponents of mandatory pro bono offer legal, moral, and
administrative objections to the imposition of a mandatory pro bono
program.' The main legal objections are as follows: (1) mandatory pro
bono constitutes a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition
against involuntary servitude;8 (2) mandatory pro bono is a violation of
the Fifth Amendment in that forcing lawyers to work without compensation constitutes an impermissible taking;' (3) mandatory pro bono forces
lawyers to represent clients whose interests may not coincide with the
lawyers' interests and beliefs, thereby violating lawyers' First Amendment right of freedom of association;"0 (4) mandatory pro bono violates
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection because it
singles out lawyers from other citizens and requires them to render
service to the poor;" and (5) the judiciary lacks the inherent authority
to order lawyers to perform uncompensated legal work.
The first legal objection regarding involuntary servitude is inapplicable because the lawyer has a choice. The choice may be to not practice
rather than perform the service, but that is still a choice. Involuntary
servitude contemplates a condition of service where there is no choice.
The second legal objection is also inapplicable because, according to
established precedent, a taking only occurs when the thing taken is
deprived of all value. Therefore, requiring a few hours per year of a
lawyer's time does not constitute a taking. 3 In response to the third
6. Id. at 894.
7. See, e.g., Esther F Lardent, MandatoryPro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer
to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REv. 78 (1990).

8. The Thirteenth Amendment stated, in pertinent part: "Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude.... shall exist within the United States
...... "U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
9. The Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. The First Amendment states, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to

assemble ..

" U.S. CONST. amend. I.

11. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.

XiV, § 1.
12. Rebuttals to each of these legal challenges have been explored elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Michael Millemann, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right
Question, 49 MD. L. REv. 18 (1990).
13. But see In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Proceedings,
475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979) (holding unconstitutional the compulsory rendition of
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legal objection, assignment to the representation of indigent clients does
not require a lawyer to adopt a client's personal beliefs any more than
being retained by a client forces the lawyer to adopt a client's personal
views. The fourth objection fails because no equal protection claim
exists. Lawyers are not a protected class although, by virtue of their
monopoly on the practice of law, they are already essentially a special
group. Finally, the fifth legal objection has no basis because the
judiciary has the exclusive authority to regulate admission to practice
and maintenance of the right to practice. The right to order mandatory
pro bono falls within the gambit of that authority.
The moral objections raised are that, by establishing a mandatory pro
bono obligation, the laudatory nature of volunteering will be removed, 4
and the poor will be subjected to a horde of lawyers who are incompetent to perform the specialized work involved in representing their
interests.' However, lawyers engaged in voluntary efforts will not be
compelled to forgo those efforts by mandatory plans. In fact, those
lawyers, in all likelihood, will exceed the requirement of hours by work
already being done.
The fear of incompetent lawyers set loose on the already disadvantaged poor raises a concern which, on the surface, appears legitimate.
However, assigned lawyers still would be required to meet ethical
obligations of providing the competent and zealous representation to
indigent clients. Failure to do so would subject assigned lawyers to
disciplinary procedures just as failure to provide competent representation to a paying client would trigger disciplinary action. 6
Interestingly, those who object to mandatory pro bono sometimes are
forced to argue against themselves in order to state all of the objections.
For instance, the argument that poverty work requires specialized
knowledge is countered by the argument that poor people's legal needs
are simple and basic and do not require mandating enormous lawyer

services).
14. See Lardent, supra note 7, at 80, 82, 88. Mandatory pro bono has been referred to as
an oxymoron. See id. at 79.
15. There was a hint of concern on this issue expressed by Supreme Court Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor. See Alan M. Slobodin, Pro Bono Should Be Free Choice, NAT'L L.J., May 25,
1992 (mandatory pro bono could become a "recipe for malpractice") (quoting Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor speech to the American Bar Association Annual Meeting, August 1991).
16. I have questioned in another article whether disciplinary rules actually do require
zealous representation on behalf of poor people. See Michelle S. Jacobs, Legal Professionalism:
Do Ethical Rules Require Zealous Representationfor PoorPeople?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 97,
102 (1995).
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hours.17 Both arguments have been made in opposition to mandatory
pro bono.
The tension surrounding the issue of whether pro bono should be
mandatory is fueled by the very nature of our professional work. The
lawyer's historical image is that of a public servant. The image
presented, both historically and contemporaneously, is that of the lawyer
who always answers the call of service, both because it is morally right
to do so and because it is professionally required. Historically, the
requirement derived from the special duty that lawyers have to "do
justice," as well as recognition of the monopoly over the provision of
legal services that lawyers enjoy. 8 But the profession caters to the
needs and wants of a very limited segment of society. 9 While current
levels of competition for client dollars give the notion of monopoly a
different pall from historic times, nonetheless, it still is true today that
only licensed lawyers are authorized to do individual, unsupervised
representation of clients.
Despite our noble, historical call to service, our commitment as a
profession to providing access to justice for the poor is conflicting at
best. As every state survey in the recent past has shown, the poor still
have limited access to our judicial system.2 ° Both mandatory and
voluntary programs attempt to address the need and neither fare well.
Perhaps efforts to resolve the problem of access to justice for the poor

17. See Debra Burke et al., Mandatory Pro Bono: Cui Bono?, 25 STETSON L. REV. 983,
989 (1996) (arguing that the needs of the poor are simplistic); but see Roger C. Cramton,
Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113, 1127 (1991) (arguing that mandatory pro bono
will burden the poor with unqualified lawyers because the legal needs of the poor are highly
specialized).
18. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMEs 5 (1953).
19. It has been stated that 90% of licensed lawyers represent the interest of 10% of the
population. Comments by President Jimmy Carter at the ABA cited in Cramton, supra note 17,
at 1119 (comments by President Jimmy Carter at the 100th Anniversary Luncheon of the Los
Angeles County Bar Association).
20. The New York reports say only 20% of unmet needs are being addressed. Maine says
25%. The fact remains that, despite efforts, the poor remain under-served. See, e.g., Patricia J.
Brown & Peggi Cornelius, Dispelling the Myths of Pro Bono, 32 ARIZ. ATr'Y, Apr. 1996, at 15
(announcing conference to strategize ways to meet legal needs of the poor in Arizona); Marrero
Committee Report, supra note 3 (New York); James W. Meeker & John Dombrick, 2020 Vision:
A Planfor the Futureof California'sCourts, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2217 (1993) (discussing unmet
needs of California's poor); Millemann, supra note 12 (Maryland); Minnesota Supreme Court
Task Force on Racial Bias in the JudicialSystem, 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 477, 665-93 (1993)
(Minnesota's unmet legal need for people of color and the poor); William P. Quigley, The
Unmet Civil Needs of the Poor in Louisiana, 19 S.U.L. REV. 273 (1992); Rau, supra note 2
(Maine); Louis S. Rulli, Foreword: Pennsylvania Legal Services at Risk, 68 TEMPLE L. REV.
541 (1995) (citing Pennsylvania Bar Association Task Force for Legal Services to the Needy A2, Dec. 1990).
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are doomed to fail because the profession does not have a clear vision
or consensus of what the programs should achieve.
In filing its final report, the Committee to Improve the Availability
of Legal Services (Marrero Committee) presented the goal of pro bono
service in the manner that the majority of lawyers probably envision it.
In the view of the committee, the lawyer's pro bono work should be
restricted to improvement of the administration of justice by simplifying
the legal process for, or increasing the availability and quality of, legal
services to poor persons." The committee stated that "it is grotesque
to have a system in which the law guarantees to the poor that their
basic human needs will be met but which provides individuals no
realistic means with which to enforce that right."22 The committee
further stated that a "justice system which allows vast disparities in
access to justice based on ability to pay cannot truly be called a system
of justice at all."' The committee observed that lawyers have a special
role in protecting the fairness and legitimacy of our legal system, a
legitimacy which cannot stand if people are denied access on the basis
of ability to pay.24
The Marrero Committee and others hope to provide better access to
justice for the poor. However, the committee's approach serves to
illuminate one of the problems with pro bono plans regardless of
whether they are mandatory in nature. Such plans focus on providing
access to a legal system which in many ways is ineffective in dealing
with the complexities and realities of poverty. Pro bono programs
attempt to place poor citizens in the same seats in the courtroom as
those citizens who have the means to hire an attorney. In overly
simplistic terms, the plans hope to assist the poor person in having her
day in court.
A clear example of the ineffective results of one such plan is
supplied by Professor Michael Millemann from the University of
Maryland School of Law.' In an article supporting mandatory pro
bono, Millemann describes a common scene occurring now in Baltimore
City Rent Court where tenant after tenant, each unrepresented by

21. The committee defined the provision of services in this way to intentionally narrow
the category of services that would qualify as pro bono. There was concern among the
committee that much of the voluntary pro bono effort being undertaken did not inure to the
benefit of the poor people whose legal needs were unmet. Marrero Committee Report, supra
note 3, at 793-94.
22. Id. at 775 (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 793.
25. See Millemann, supra note 12.
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counsel, lines up to receive items called "white slips."26 These tenants
are present because they have received notices of eviction. They are
accepting put-out orders and getting the slips so that they can obtain
emergency Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC)2 By agreeing to the
put-out, the tenant gives up certain legal rights and remedies that she
may have against the landlord.2" In Millemann's vision of Baltimore
City Rent Court several years after imposition of mandatory pro bono,
tenants receiving notices for eviction still will line up for white slips,
but there will be a lawyer present to explain the rights they are giving
up and to counsel them on their ability to proceed on various claims
against the landlord.29
The problem with this vision is that it still begins with many tenants
lined up, after receiving notices of eviction, in Baltimore City Rent
Court. The new presence of the lawyer, either in the advising role on the
"white slip" line or as assigned counsel to handle the eviction case at
trial, will not impact the ongoing inability of the tenant to pay the rent.
Representation of the client's counterclaims at trial will mean nothing
if the tenant has no way to compel the landlord to make repairs or to
ensure that the repairs are made correctly with materials of appropriate
quality. In truth, the individual client's battle with housing will be
delayed for another day, but the question of whether a net benefit will
have been achieved in providing access to justice must be asked.30
Having one's day in court may be a hollow victory for a poor person.
Traditional notions of "access to justice" entertained by the majority
in the profession narrowly embrace only helping the poor to have a
voice in court. There is no commitment to alter fundamentally the legal
structures which help institutionalize poverty. Despite the Marrero
Committee's claim that poor people are guaranteed basic human needs,
the Committee's own definition of access more realistically reflects the
scope of what pro bono work seeks to accomplish.3 Neither our

26. Id. at 25.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 76. The vision includes other stages of assistance as well, i.e., actual
appointment of lawyers to represent the clients if they chose to go forward. Id.
30. The complexity of this issue is explored by Silverman, supra note 1, at i067-70.
Without doubt this is a difficult issue for the profession. The individual need for representation
is great and efforts to secure representation must continue. However, the inability or
unwillingness to recognize the fact that individual representation never can produce sufficient
access to legal justice for poor people inherently dooms the ability of pro bono plans to achieve
the level of success needed to help the poor.
31. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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society nor legal professionals have accepted the necessity of guaranteeing basic human needs.
In order to fundamentally change access to law and justice for poor
people, lawyers would need to accept the premise that the conditions
which produce poverty must change.32 If pro bono work is to matter in
any real sense, the work would need to be focused on eliminating the
conditions, both legally and otherwise, which produce and institutionalize poverty. In other words, pro bono work would need as one of its
goals the accomplishment of social justice. On this point, there is clear
disagreement within the bar. The disagreement has been explicitly
stated 33 as well as demonstrated in the ambivalence of lawyers toward
programs aimed at truly assisting the poor. Whether mandated or not,
our view of work performed on behalf of the poor is that it is "charity"
work.
Many in our profession are unwilling to undertake pro bono work,
reflecting the profession's failure to acknowledge its superficial
commitment to the eradication of poverty and its conflict over providing
services to the "undeserving poor." The ambivalence is rooted in the
ways American culture views the poor. Both our culture and law, as
well as the British legal culture from which it came, distinguished
between the poor who deserved help and those who did not.' Historically, widows and pensioners were considered "deserving poor" to
whom the charity of the state was appropriately directed. Immigrants,
single mothers, and people of color were not viewed as worthy of
assistance from the state. Their conditions of poverty were deemed by
the public and political leaders as products of defects in character (either
because of immorality, as in the case of single mothers, or because of
laziness, as was typically claimed of immigrants and people of color).35
These people were regarded as undeserving poor. And society put great
effort into limiting the amount of benefits they could collect from the
state's coffers.36

32. The necessity for fundamental change was noted by Alexander D. Forger in his
comments in a symposium on mandatory pro bono. "[An] important aspect is getting the lawyer
to see the circumstances that give rise to the problems with which he is now coping. There is
a hope always that somebody will want to get into the issue of social justice, not just legal
justice." Comments on Mr. Tabak's Paper, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 115, 121 (Response of
Alexander D. Forger to Ronald J. Tabak, How Law Firms Can Act to Increase the Pro Bono
Representation of the Poor, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 87).
33. See Silverman, supra note 1, at 1047, 1066 (noting that the bar always has been split
on the issue of whether pro bono efforts should be used to effect redistributive justice).
34. See generally JOEL HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM (1995).
35. Id. at 12-14.
36. Id.
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The split between the deserving poor and the undeserving poor is
firmly entrenched in all of our entitlement programs." Thus, it comes
as no surprise that while the Reagan administration pushed for the
elimination of the Legal Services Corporation, increased funds were
allocated to legal services entities that provided services to senior
citizens." The most recent reincarnation of the deserving/undeserving
debate was displayed prominently during arguments and debates
regarding welfare reform.3 9 Single mothers were demonized by both
Congress and the President, despite the fact that the program which
specifically deals with the children of single mothers, AFDC, constituted
approximately two to three percent of the entire entitlement budget.
Because the notions of deserving and undeserving poor are deeply
imbedded in our culture, it follows that the law institutionalizes our
cultural notions. Thus, the view of the indigent client as "undeserving"
unconsciously becomes a part of the reality of the profession. The
insidiousness of the view regarding client worthiness is demonstrated in
the profession's reaction to the legal services crisis, as well as in the
very ways the plights of the poor are discussed within our ranks. When
the Legal Services Corporation was under the first stage of attack by the
Reagan Administration, to the credit of organized bars throughout the
country lawyers rallied and called for continuing and maintaining the
existence of the Legal Services Corporation. Many bar associations
called upon their members to step forward and volunteer to close the
anticipated gap in representation that the loss of funds would create for
legal services clientele. The Legal Services Corporation did survive both
the Reagan and Bush Administrations. However, deep cuts were made
in the programs which have not been restored to date. Local bars in
many states reported increases in the numbers of lawyers agreeing to
volunteer.
However, in the final analysis, the number of lawyers who agreed to
step forward was comparatively small. Many of those volunteering did
not actually accept cases from the target client population. 0 The level
37. Id. at 28 (discussing the history in the United States of limiting aid for mothers with
children to only white women).
38. See Rau, supra note 2, at 240. This is not to debate that senior citizens are needy of
legal services as well, but merely to point out that the retention and expansion of legal services
to the elderly, a traditional "deserving" group, was valued (without restrictions based on
income), despite some data which suggests that the elderly poor face fewer legal problems then
do, for example, single mothers. Id. at 238.
39. The virulent attack on single mothers undercut previous attempts to explain attacks
on other programs servicing the poor as just the personal agenda of President Reagan. Rather,
they demonstrate a systematic approach to the evaluation of the worth of poor people who fit
into the definition of the "undeserving poor."
40. The words of Forger underscore that the lack of sufficient voluntary efforts result from
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of volunteerism fell woefully short of meeting the new need. As a
profession, we expressed our public objections to the reduction and
restriction of legal services to the poor but we did not combine the
objections with private contributions of lawyer time. Even today,
Congress continues to restrict and reduce the efforts of the Legal
Services Corporation. Although volunteerism has increased among
lawyers, painfully little of that volunteerism is addressed specifically to
the unmet legal needs of the poor. It is this very aversion to actually
representing the targeted population that the Marrero Committee sought
to eliminate by restricting what kinds of lawyer contributions would
qualify as pro bono.
Further examples of the undercurrent of ambivalence to the necessity
for helping the poor can be found in some of the comments opposing
mandatory pro bono. It has been argued, for example, that if poor
people have access to lawyers at the same level as paying clients, there
will be an explosion of litigation which will force the already crowded
dockets of the courts to collapse. The implicit, though unstated
conclusion is that poor people should be excluded from the process so
that the process can continue to function. This is as close to a statement
that the rights of the poor are not "important" as one can find.41 Legal
services lawyers have commented that private lawyers, while voicing
their understanding and support of the need for representation for poor
people, often chastise them when they vigorously pursue a matter on
behalf of a poor client. The private lawyers only accept the validity of
the representation to the point it does not inconvenience their paying
clients or make it more expensive for them to litigate against the poor
person.4" Other lawyers try to evaluate the legal needs of poor people
in terms of their material wealth, equating the presence or absence of
material wealth as a guidepost for establishing the necessity of
counsel.43 Since poor people lack material wealth, it is regarded as
overall lack of interest within the profession. "Frankly, the lawyers aren't interested. It is not
simply a question of providing the opportunity [for lawyer participation]." Comments on Mr
Tabak's Paper,supra note 32, at 120.
41. It seems completely improper to suggest poor people should bear the burden of court
congestion. Excluding poor litigants from the courthouse will not solve the problem of docket
control as the problem is a result of inadequate funding by state legislatures, not overuse of the

courts by the poor.
42. Interview with Andrea Williams and Siobhan McGowan, former attorneys with Bergen
County Legal Services, Hackensack, New Jersey, Dec. 20, 1995.
43. See Jonathan R. Macey, Mandatory Pro Bono: Comfort for the Poor or Welfare for
the Rich?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 117 (1992). One such economically-based argument
reasoned that poor people may decline to retain lawyers in matrimonial matters because there
are not enough assets in the matrimonial estate to justify the expense. Id. This ignores the need
and value for an orderly resolution of other matrimonial issues for poor people, such as child
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inefficient and ineffective to use lawyer time on such matters. Others
argue that mandatory pro bono would force lawyers into pursuing
meritless claims on behalf of the poor, thereby implying that the poor
have no real or legally "significant" problems."
Even within the legal services community, there can be tension and
debate as to whether the needs of the poor are properly valued by the
lawyers who dedicate themselves to representing the indigent.45 Some
legal services lawyers have argued that, while it is important to
represent individual clients in all phases of poverty work, landlord
tenant court, family court, consumer matters, and administrative
tribunals regarding entitlement, nonetheless the leadership of legal
services organizations have not had sufficient appreciation for the
complexities of the lives of poor people and have undervalued the need
of the client population for institutional change. 6 Included within that
critique has been the allegation that the legal services community has
failed to include the voice of the poor client in any significant way on
the boards which set policy and allocate resources for individual legal
services organizations,47 and also has failed to hire lawyers whose
background and ethnicity reflect those of the client population.4"
Finally, the legal services community has been criticized for its failure
to understand the intersection of race, poverty, and the ways in which
the ongoing deprivation of civil rights for people of color contribute to
the institutionalization of poverty.49 In this way, the legal services

support and visitation and the equitable distribution of marital debt.
44. Id. at 1118. Of all of the disparaging comments, this one is the oddest. Pro bono plans
usually call for service in either one of two ways. A lawyer may be required to take one or two
cases a year, or some relatively minimal amount of time may be designated to be given over the
period of one year or in some cases on a biennial basis. The estimate of hours range from 10-40.
No plan requires any lawyer to file a lawsuit on behalf of the assigned client. Moreover, when
a client pays a lawyer to represent the client in obtaining redress for an wrong, imagined or not,
wouldn't that lawyer have a greater incentive to view a potentially meritless case as one having
litigation potential?
45. See Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethicfor Legal Services Practice,
37 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1109 (1990).
46. See Paul E. Lee & Mary M. Lee, Reflectionsfrom the Bottom of the Well: RacialBias
in the Provisionof Legal Services to the Poor, 1993 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 311, 311-21 (Special
Issue).
47. Id. at 315.
48. Id. at 314.
49. See john a. powell, Race and Poverty: A New Focus for Legal Services, 1993
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 299, 299-309 (Special Issue). The author critiques the legal services
approach of "universality" in the rendering of service: that is, if all poor people are helped, then
"minority" poor people will be helped as well. In the opinion of the author, this approach
ignores the needs of the legal services populations of color, as there are distinct differences in
the lives and conditions of even blacks and whites who live in relative economic parity. Id. at
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lawyer community is no more free from entrenched notions of worthiness than is its counterpart in the private bar.5"
The deeply ingrained notion of the selective worthiness of poor
people's claims is reflected even in the attitudes of law students, whom
for the most part have never participated in representing the interests of
the poor. From the vantage of a clinical program, these attitudes are
reflected in the students' evaluations of the worthiness of their clients
cases and of the worthiness of the clients themselves.51 It is apparent
that the notion of service, for both lawyers and students, is tied to a
belief that poor clients should be grateful for the efforts of an attorney
on their behalf. 2
Perhaps the Marrero Committee had this in mind when it recommended mandatory pro bono as opposed to voluntary efforts. The
committee understood that lawyers view voluntary efforts as charity.53
While charity may produce benevolent feelings on behalf of those
rendering service, charity work does not necessarily assume the priority
that the committee believed provision of legal services for the poor
requires. The committee observed that public service work, as a charity,
is likely to take lesser rank among lawyers' other professional pressures
300.
50. See Lee & Lee, supra note 46, at 312 (stating that it has been suspected by many legal
services clients and their advocates of color that members of the legal services community have
gained self-esteem by looking down on their poor clients of color); see also Silverman, supra
note I, at 1038 (arguing that even among most lawyers who are deeply committed to the poor
many factors may prevent clients from being able to evaluate the quality of legal services
rendered. Among the factors cited are the distancing effects of class and racial attitudes, real or
perceived).
51. See Jacobs, supra note 16, at 101. The suspicion often is echoed in a student's
willingness to criticize a client's failure to appear for appointments or court dates as a moral
defect. The assumption is made before any investigation is conducted as to why the client
missed the appointment. In a discussion of a mock client interview among clinical students at
Columbia University, one student commented, after learning that a "client" could not make an
appointment because his daughter was ill, that the client should be grateful the clinic wanted to
serve him, because there were others that the clinic could serve. The student felt that if the client
was not going to be "responsible," then the clinic should not help him. The exercise did take
place at the beginning of the semester, prior to the students' exposure to client-centered
counseling, but the student's security in the validity of his view was instructive for me.
52. The Honorable Joseph W. Bellacosa of the New York State Court of Appeals was
prompted to comment that, "The needy give lawyers something to be proud of as well. They
allow us to give rise to greater, more humane heights as professionals. For that, they deserve not
a patronizing attitude of noblesse oblige, but one of great dignity, respect and appreciation."
Joseph W. Bellacosa, Obligatory Pro Bono Publico Legal Services: Mandatory or Voluntary?
Distinction Without a Difference?, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 747 (1991).
53. Marrero Committee Report, supra note 3, at 823; see also Tigran W. Eldred &
Thomas Schoenherr, The Lawyer's Duty of Public Service: More Than Charity, 96 W. VA. L.
REV. 367, 374 (1993/94) (legal culture understands pro bono to be an act of personal charity).
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and personal commitments that are not obligatory.14 Moreover, charity
work is regarded as purely a discretionary act of kindness rather than a
professional duty. For the poor, charity work provides an uneven and
unreliable level of representation. 6
The discussion above focuses mainly on the influence of tendencies
and biases which remain hidden from the lawyer's conscious mind. The
discussion presumes that the lawyers involved are competent and not
resistant to the "principle" of pro bono. The analysis must take on a
different tone when the lawyer involved actively resists or resents the
imposition of a pro bono requirement. It is this aspect of mandatory
proposals which is most troubling. To assert that the lawyer once
compelled will comply with her duty, even if begrudgingly, should not
produce a vision of comfort for advocates for the poor.
Even within the very dedicated legal services community it is
difficult to ensure a consistent level of quality of service to the client.5 7
Office resources, client education, and level of sophistication, as well as
client expectation, can seriously impact a lawyer's ability to render
consistent quality service.58 Beyond the issue of willingness, training
in lawyer-client dynamics is woefully deficient for most lawyers. Little
attention is given in most law school curriculums to the dynamics of the
lawyer-client relationship. Nor is it an area where continuing legal
education courses abound. Further, we pay little attention, in the few
courses that do exist, to the ways in which lawyer-initiated behavior
adversely impacts the quality of the lawyer-client interaction. This is
particularly troublesome when the lawyer is interacting with a client
population that does not reflect the lawyer's own culture and values 9-a population in which many mandatorily-assigned indigent
clients will surely fit.
To this already difficult scenario, mandatory pro bono adds a
reluctant or resentful attorney. It would be fair, and probably highly
realistic, to assume that the resentful lawyer only will do the minimallymandated hours under the relevant provisions. There is no incentive to
provide a high-quality level of representation to the assigned client, and

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 824.
57. Silverman, supra note 1, at 1036.
58. Id.
59. The problems that lawyer ignorance can create are explored in Michelle S. Jacobs,
People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-CenteredCounseling, 27 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 345, 346 (1997).
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as long as the lawyer performs in a way that is minimally competent,
there can be no recourse through disciplinary action either. Such an
assignment would technically provide "access to justice" for the client,
but in form only-not in substance.' Again, we return to the root
question: what is mandatory pro bono trying to accomplish?
The social and legal needs of the poor are complex at the same time
they are incredibly simple. The poor need to have a standard of living
that allows them to escape the clutches of poverty. The law impacts on
the ability of the poor to escape poverty in many ways, both by
institutionalizing the poverty and by denying that the poverty itself
shapes the way law is applied to the poor. The desire to provide access
to justice for the poor is a laudatory one, which I support wholeheartedly. However, before our profession can make lasting and permanent
progress toward providing that access, we must come to grips with the
reality of our own divisions and diversity of opinion.
If the profession wants to provide a measure of social justice to the
poor, mandatory pro bono, as we are envisioning it now, will not
accomplish this goal. We cannot lull ourselves into feeling good about
support for mandatory programs when we know that realistically they
are too narrowly constructed to accomplish social justice. If our view of
access to justice is closer to the individual representation model, then
mandatory pro bono will not help ensure that poor people receive
quality representation any more than does the existence of formal legal
services organizations. The minimal hours proposed can do little more
than help the clients stay in place. Until we can agree as a profession
that it is social justice and access to legal justice that we are trying to
achieve, mandatory pro bono requirements ring false.61

60. A similar effect is created by The Florida Bar's position on pro bono. Pro bono work

is not actually mandated, but everyone is required to report whether or not they have performed
any pro bono work.
61. I do not mean to disparage the great efforts made by many lawyers to engage in pro
bono work. If it were not for their valiant efforts, the poor would not even be able to maintain
the status quo. My comments, however, are directed beyond the status quo and require us to ask
ourselves individually, and as members of our profession, whether we want to envision a world
in which a person's economic wealth does not control her real access to justice.
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